Polish-Ukrainian Relations

Despite its political engagement – whether it be supporting the Maidan revolution, condemning Russian activity in Crimea and Donbas, or advocating the case of Ukraine in NATO and the EU – Poland still appears not to be clear in its opinion about Ukraine. It is seemingly most visible in the recent reappearance of the matter of the Volhynia massacre in Polish media that shook public opinion, and, once again, raised social tensions. Such evidence of unsettled historical events – considered by many to be unhealed wounds even – impedes the development of seamless relations between two countries. It is apparently difficult to address this matter; yet Polish foreign policy has to rely on a solid foundation, and decisions it takes should be conscious. For now, devoid of decisiveness, both politicians and public opinion struggle to clarify their position and approach to the Volhynia massacre, and this is reflected in the media's portrayal of the issue.

At first glance, it could be said that Polish media present the Volhynia massacre homogenously, regardless of the ideology they support. The story appears to be stunningly simple, and, as the Newsweek puts it, “even the current defenders of Stepan Bandera recognise what happened”. In plain numbers, there were approximately fifty thousand Polish victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, whose only guilt was their nationality. Yet, media reports indicate different approaches Poland should take to close the case of Volhynia ultimately. The right highlights the fact that this tragedy seems to be neglected by consecutive governments; for example, kresy.pl signified the need to create a lawsuit – in the form of an act or a policy – for the Volhynia genocide, which appears to be an unsurprising claim given that the website represents the views of descendants of those who were killed in this region. On the left, Trybuna.eu claims that the political debate about Volhynia in Sejm has entirely lost the tone of “decency and seriousness”; it points out that the leaders of the ruling party have focused on helping Americans in setting an “anti-Russian crusade” – simultaneously comforting his voters and the ambitions of his party members – instead of actually addressing the problem of blurred politics of memory.

Admittedly, what seems to shine through the majority of reports is the importance of the political consequences of what happened in Volhynia. Rzeczpospolita raises the argument that it is the time for Ukrainians to accept responsibility for the Volhynia massacre through discussion and issuing a unified statement. The same webpage, however, recalls the words of a Polish MEP, who claims there is neither legal background nor justified need to request some kind of apology from the Ukrainian side. He explained that, in accordance with the Hague Convention, it should be the German government that takes responsibility for the genocide, because it was Nazi Germany that ruled Ukraine at that time. What, however, Ukrainians are responsible for, the MEP claims, is their glorification of Bandera and UPA’s activities, which is a criminal act. Nevertheless, it is clear that such reminiscences of the past are not particularly welcomed now, when Ukraine faces regular warfare on its eastern territories, has lost control over Crimea and the political construction built from the Maidan revolution seems to be shaky. Eventually, what came into being is the Polish Sejm’s resolution concerning the Volhynia genocide, which provoked an immense and negative response from the Ukrainian side. However, it is not the only source of sceptic reviews; Gazeta Wyborcza comments that it is a kind of paradox: the resolution was officially aimed at improving Polish-Ukrainian relations, and, at the same time, highlighted the Ukrainians’ responsibility for the genocide. On the other hand, Polonia Christiana turns attention to details of issuing the resolution: from the legal perspective, such a document has no genuine impact, as it is not a legal act. Therefore, the only reason behind it is to please voters and simultaneously not enrage Ukrainians. This, as Najwyższy Czas deduces, is the natural consequence of American politics in this region: the US has not invested such great effort and funds in the Ukrainian revolution merely to accept such forms of disobedience and aggression from the Polish side.

The celebration of the Independence Day of Ukraine, which was honoured by Poland’s president, Andrzej Duda, might have been the turning point, because during the event both countries’ presidents announced the creation of a “strategic partnership”. This statement, however, was received differently in Poland. On the one hand, Gazeta Wyborcza noted that the presidents acknowledged agreements set by their predecessors and recognised the beneficial cooperation between the two countries. The Polish president addressed the need to base further relations on truth, and that, thus, it is vital to discuss and solve troubling historical issues; his counterpart, Petro Poroshenko, declared his positive attitude towards this approach and accepted the formation of a committee composed of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance and its Ukrainian counterpart. On the other hand, Goniec points out that the Polish President was the only guest of such a high rank who attended the independence day celebrations, “which demonstrates not only the position of Ukraine on the international political scene, but also Polish obsequiousness”. The publication also raised the fact that Poroshenko did not express any genuine obligation towards Poland, whereas Duda declared “not only friendship, but love even”. Such a lack of commitment from the Ukrainian side could have been noticed when Poland was not invited to Minsk, where deputies from France, Germany and Russian Federation had a discussion about the future of Ukraine with Poroshenko.

The cinematic attempt at addressing this challenging subject – the recently released film “Volhynia” by Wojciech Smarzowski – has divided Polish society; it was received by some as a step forward on the bumpy road to reconciliation, and by others as a destructive move that would doom the barely existing peace. The director himself claims it is hardly a subtle and straightforward issue; yet, he believes that his film will have cleansing effect on Polish-Ukrainian relations in the future, providing politicians will now take decisive steps to reach a compromise. By covering a wider spectrum of events, the film does not judge and generalise the complex nature of the Volhynia massacre. In contrast, Kultura Liberalna is more than sceptical about the overtone of “Wołyń”; the director is described as gore-loving and pain-praising, and the film is said to be devoid of any heart-warming and inspirational aspects. It does not include the former presidents’ declarations to learn from mistakes, and Polish support for the Ukrainian revolution, which came after the massacre, and, therefore, declares that thinking about the film as a form of reconciliation is a “grim joke”.

Gazeta Wyborcza claims it was a particularly inappropriate time to produce the film like “Wołyń”, as Ukraine is struggling with both internal – the crisis of power and economy – and external – war in Donbas and Crimea – problems. Moreover, the point is raised in the article that the film describes only the Polish perspective, and the image of Ukrainians is painted in black. With the blame for the massacre put on nationalism, Gazeta Wyborcza highlights that “Wołyń” did not mention the plight of Ukrainians in the Second Polish Republic, where they were diminished, repressed and second-class citizens. On the other hand, Do Rzeczy signifies the utmost importance of the production – which it calls the most exceptional historical film in Polish cinematography – as it finally commemorates the victims of Ukrainian nationalists. In a review by Niezależna.pl, it is mentioned that there are groups of nationalists in Ukraine who admit that what happened in Volhynia was a genocide. They issued an open letter in which it was claimed that history cannot be changed, only accepted; therefore, they did not praise those who murdered the innocent, and instead laid flowers by the statue commemorating victims of Volhynia genocide.

Nevertheless, Polish-Ukrainian relations do not only cover what lies in the distant past. There are voices from the right uttering that the Polish government acted imprudently by backing the Maidan revolution and condemning the referendum in Crimea. Supporters of such claims signify the strategic importance of a weak, dependent and indigent Ukraine that will separate Poland from the Russian Federation and pose no threats at the same time. Therefore, Polish diplomacy should not endorse everything the Kiev government suggests, according to prawy.pl, “but make the existence of Ukraine depend on an act of Polish good will (for which Kiev will have to strive every single day again and again)”. “Newsweek”, by contrast, criticises the relatively insignificant engagement and support for Ukraine that Poland provides, in comparison to what was done during the Maidan revolution. Poland missed the momentum to tighten bonds with Ukraine; instead of advocating the matter of Ukraine in the EU and NATO, and strengthening the development of its democracy, Poland turned to its national affairs. It should not be surprising then that Ukraine turned for help in Berlin and Washington. Yet, another concept – aired on the Radio Maryja – indicates that the only idea behind the Polish political activity in Ukraine was to harass Putin; this might have been encouraged by ‘the Jewish lobby in Poland’, as the author puts it, in order to maintain the chaos in Ukraine that occurred after the Maidan revolution, which was allegedly sponsored by George Soros.

Despite more than half a century having passed, it seems that there is still much to be done to settle the case of Volhynia. It is, therefore, not only for politicians from both sides to reach an agreement, but also for the nation itself to move forward. Yet, it does not mean that the Volhynia massacre has to be forgotten; it does not justify hate either.